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  Hello Dolly, Hello Dolly: Human Cloning, Ethics and Identity
By Rebecca Wynn

Comments about this paper can be sent to: rebeccawynn@hotmail.com

Introduction

On the 23 February 1997, the world woke up to news of a new technological advance, an advance that, according to Lee Sliver, a Princeton geneticist, "shook the foundations of biology and philosophy" (1). This advance was embodied in a "little lamb" going by the name of Dolly. That morning, Dolly the sheep became a media sensation. She was the lead story on every television and radio broadcast and graced the front page of every newspaper around the world. Yet at first glance, one could be forgiven for wondering what was so special about this white faced sheep. For all the world, Dolly looked like hundreds of the other lambs that dot the hills and fields of Scotland; and indeed for six months this lamb had grazed quietly and unnoticed among them. Compared to many of the freakish sights that science had previously greeted us with (2), Dolly appeared positively ordinary. However, Dolly, despite appearances, had had a most unusual conception. She was not the end result of a fusion of sperm with egg, but had been cloned from a single cell taken from the breast tissue of an adult sheep.

It would be an understatement to say that the news that Dolly was genetically identical to her mother was not well received. Pence's observation, "It took about a second for the questions to begin. And another for the condemnations" (3) seems closer to the mark. Dolly was dubbed by bioethicists, theologians, journalists and even scientists alike as a wolf in sheep's clothing. The metaphor had come alive! Of course it was not Dolly per se that had triggered this blanket disapproval, the pundits were not concerned about sheep but about people. It was the idea that this technology could be applied to humans, "that humans could be cloned in a manner akin to taking cuttings from a plant" that had stirred their fear and their imagination. Within hours of Dolly's announcement, eminent politicians and policy-makers were lining up to jump on the anti-cloning bandwagon. President Clinton rushed to ban federal funding of cloning research and urged private biological firms to do the same. The day after Dolly's announcement, he jolted his recently appointed National Bioethics Commission into action. The cloning of Dolly, he told them "raises serious ethical questions, particularly with respect to the possible use of this technology to clone human embryos." Here in Britain, our government duly rewarded Ian Wilmut, the scientist responsible for creating Dolly, with the withdrawal of all further funds for his research. Theologians delivered a similar anti-cloning message. Religious groups across the world, echoed the comments of Nancy Duff at the Princeton Theological Seminary, "Many people wonder if this is a miracle for which we can thank God for or an ominous way of playing God ourselves", while the Vatican pronounced cloning as "contrary to the moral law" as it stood "in opposition to the dignity both of human procreation and the conjugal union." The opposition from the public too was startlingly impressive; a Time/CNN poll conducted a few days after the announcement found that 93% of Americans disapproved of cloning humans. Others however, simply cashed in. Seizing the day, Canon (the company that makes photocopiers) produced an advertisement featuring two identical sheep, "Big deal" the advertisement read, " We've been making perfect copies for years". (4)

Despite the seemingly unanimous consensus, some commentators have slipped through the woodwork that are not afraid of human cloning. One of these is Gregory Pence, he believes that "These knee-jerk condemnations stem from fear and ignorance; they should not be mistaken for moral wisdom". (5) Our conception of what a clone is, Pence feels is fuelled by a diet of science fiction; science fiction however, that has very little in common with the science fact. I think Pence makes a valid point. We are tainted by the films such as the "Invasion of the Body Snatchers", which "teaches" us that clones will emerge fully-grown from their pods or womb tanks, growing from zygotes to adult size in a few days. As well as, "The Boys from Brazil", in which an evil scientist clones multiple copies of Adolph Hitler. The presumption behind this film is that a person's clones will have identical personalities and beliefs to him. If people realised that real clones were not like their fictional counterparts, perhaps they would not deem cloning ethically unacceptable. John Harris is another commentator who seems to be losing little sleep over the prospect of human clones. He is more concerned with the lack of substantive discussion of the issue. He states, "The ethical implications of human clones have been much alluded to but seldom have been examined with any rigor". In a review of the official responses to human cloning by authorities such as, the World Health Organisation, the European Parliament and UNESCO, he finds their statements "thin on argument and rationale; they appear to have been plucked from the air to justify an instant reaction. There are vague references to "human rights" or "basic principles" with little or no attempt to explain what these principles are, or to indicate how they might apply to cloning" (6).

The aim of this essay is to examine the issue of human cloning with the "rigor" John Harris feels is lacking from many of the other discussions of the topic. It will attempt to dispel the cloning myths and set the discussion in its actual context. One of my main objectives will be dispel what I regard to be the predominant cloning myth, the idea that my clone will be identical to me in beliefs and personality. This section will approach the myth by discussing the idea that cloning might provide a way to bring relatives back from the dead or enable a person to live forever. After this section, the dissertation will review many of the arguments against human cloning. The particular arguments I will be focusing on will include, the contention that cloning ought to be prohibited because the majority feels that it ought to, and the idea that human cloning is an affront to human dignity. The section on human dignity will explore what human dignity actually is and then sketch out the ways in which the opponents of human cloning have seen cloning as infringing human dignity. The opponents of cloning have suggested that human cloning will result in instrumentalisation, or using people as a means rather than treating them as an end. They have also suggested that cloning transgresses human rights, for example, the right to two parents and the right to a unique genetic identity. I shall also briefly touch on the idea that cloning is unnatural and so morally unacceptable.

Unfortunately due to the confines of space I have had to jettison the discussion of some arguments against cloning. One argument I have excluded is the idea that cloning is wrong because it is against God's Will. The reason I decided to forego discussion of this issue is that I feel that it has less impact than other arguments against cloning in our secular age. Moreover, I feel that a person who wants to take this stance has some heavyweight questions to answer before his objection can even get off the ground. These would include "how do you know that God exists or what his will is regarding human cloning?" and "Why do you believe that we ought to obey him?" In addition I have had to exclude arguments against cloning humans on safety grounds. I have decided to do this because, although safety issues have a significant impact on whether cloning is ethically acceptable or not, they are unlikely to be illuminated by philosophical discussion (7).Whether human cloning is unsafe or not, is a question for science. Moreover, the safety of cloning is likely to be improved by further research. My contention in this dissertation is that cloning (once proven safe by scientific research) is ethically acceptable. Although specific applications of cloning might be regarded as ethically dubious, cloning per se is not.

What is Cloning?

The word clone first appeared in the language of science at the beginning of the 20th century to describe "groups of plants that are propagated by the use of any form of vegetative parts" (8). Since then cloning has been used to describe the process by which a cell or group of cells, from one individual organism is used to derive an entirely new organism. The defining characteristic of a clone is that it is genetically identical to its parent cell or organism.

There are two distinct techniques that have been used to clone animals and could therefore in theory, be used to clone humans. The two techniques are nuclear somatic transfer or nuclear transplantation and cell mass division or embryo splitting. The first method, nuclear transplantation, was used to clone Dolly. This process involves deleting the nucleus (or the genetic material) of an egg cell and replacing it with a nucleus (the genetic material) of another cell. This cell could be either an embryonic, a fetal or adult cell. The egg is then placed between two electrodes and a direct electric current is passed through it. This breaks down the membrane separating the nucleus from the rest of the egg and allows the contents to fuse together. The egg is then transferred to the womb of a surrogate mother and develops in the normal way. Dolly was the first viable offspring produced from an adult mammalian cell. In her case, an udder cell (9) was used, theoretically though, any cell from any part of the body could be used to produce a clone. The nuclear genes of clones produced by this method will be identical, although the mitochondrial DNA of such clones would differ. We inherit mitochondrial DNA from our mother's egg. In cloning, the egg cell that has had its nucleus removed, to make way for the nucleus of the other cell, has not had its mitochondria removed. As a result the clone is not a perfect genetic copy of the original. The mitochondrial DNA can change over many years because of aging cells and environmental effects. Thus, even you are female, and carrying a clone of yourself, the clone is unlikely to inherit exactly the same mitochondrial DNA as you. Cell mass division is the artificial division of a single embryo. This technique replicates the natural process that can give rise to twins. This is done by separating embryonic cells at a very early stage of development before they have had a chance to differentiate. The clones produced using this technique will have both identical nuclear and mitochondrial genes. This technique has been used extensively in animals and has recently been used as a way of multiplying human embryos. In October 1993, at the George Washington Medical Centre, Jerry Hall and Robert Stillman cloned human embryos by splitting early two- to eight-cell embryos into single embryo cells (10). Again, if the embryo is to be brought to term it must be carried in a woman's womb for the full period of gestation. The essential difference between nuclear transplantation and embryo splitting is that while both techniques produce multiples, only nuclear transplantation has the potential to create a clone of an adult organism.

In addition, there is a potential application of nuclear transplantation technology that does not involve the creation of genetically identical individuals. This has been dubbed tissue regeneration. This technology would again involve merging a cell's nucleus with an egg. The egg would be allowed to divide and develop; however it would not be permitted to divide more than a few times. The next step would to be to bathe the cells in a protein that would direct these cells to differentiate into, for example, marrow cells or skin cells. People have envisaged this technique being used for the treatment of leukemia. Today the treatment of leukemia involves the destruction of the patient's bone marrow through chemotherapy and the transplantation of healthy marrow cells taken from a closely matched donor. The chances of finding a matching donor is less than 1 in 20,000 – or one in million if your genotype is especially rare (11). Many people die because they cannot find appropriate donors. If we used this technique however, we could create healthy marrow cells that are the perfect genetic match, from patients' own cells. Doctors could take a skin cell from the patient and then use the nuclear transplantation technique to create new marrow cells.

Misconceptions: Cloning, Identity and Immortality

Shortly after Dolly the Sheep was cloned, the Guardian ran an article featuring a man who claimed that cloning might be able to provide a route to immortality. His opinion was that since in cloning, the genetic blueprint of one individual is used to make another individual with the same genetic make-up, the new individual will be an exact copy of the original; and an exact copy is as good as the original (12). The suggestion is that we can bring back the dead by cloning them; all we need is a few cells removed from the body before death. These cells will enable us to make an exact copy of the dead person, which if the man featured in the article is to be believed, is equivalent to resurrecting them. If the process is continued time after time, the "dead" person will have achieved immortality. The man featured in the article is by no means exceptional for holding this view. The belief that we can bring back the dead by cloning them was the motivation behind a request sent to the Roslin Institute by a woman who wanted a copy of her father. Her father was approaching death, and she felt that if Wilmut could produce a clone of him, she could prevent his death (13). This belief also fuelled a heart-wrenching letter sent to the Sunday Times by a man who had just lost his son in a car accident. He objected to the furor surrounding cloning, appealing that if this technology was made available, his son could be brought back to life (14).

Our own death, and the death of others, is extremely difficult to cope with. However, I am afraid that for those hankering after immortality, or grieving for their lost loved ones, cloning offers no solution. The proposal that having one's clone made is equivalent to being resurrected, is false. Cloning does not provide the sort of immortality that we usually want. I believe that the most important feature of wanting to live forever is, wanting to experience the future of that immortal life in the same direct way that one experiences the present The way that I have experiences now, is part of the present stream of consciousness. To have future experiences in the same way, those future experiences must be part of the same stream. Thus, in order to achieve immortality, I need my clone to believe that she is me and remember living my life up to the moment when I died. The clone must see herself as waking from my death, in a similar way to how I wake from my sleep every morning. There must be a strong psychological continuity between the me that died and the me that is resurrected (my clone), up to the extent that my present stream of consciousness seems to be the continuation of the stream that I had before I died. However, if I have a clone of myself made, her consciousness will be in no way continuous with mine. My stream of consciousness will cease when I die. Her's will start when she is born. My clone's stream of consciousness will have no connection with mine; it will be her own individual stream of consciousness.

The reason that some people believe that they can resurrect dead relatives, or live forever by cloning is that they are misconceiving what human cloning actually can produce. One thing that they are overlooking is that the person produced by cloning will actually be born as a baby. Most people seem to presume that clones emerge fully-grown from womb tanks or some such contraption. However, we cannot literally photocopy people. My clone would not be an instant carbon copy of me at age twenty-one. She would gestate for nine months inside a woman's womb, (perhaps even mine), and be born as a baby. Moreover, even when she reaches twenty-one, she will not be identical to me at age twenty-one. The problem here is that people are mixing up genetic identity with personal identity. They are subscribing to genetic determinism; the idea that, genes are sufficient to make us who we are. However, monozygotic (identical) twins and conjoined (Siamese) twins are illustrative of the implausibility of this view. Both monozygotic and conjoined twins originate from the same zygote and so are genetically identical, however each twin is a different person with a different personality. This is strikingly illustrated by cases of Siamese twins. "Eng and Chang, the original Siamese twins, and the closest humans ever "cloned" at all, developed distinct and divergent personalities. One became a morose alcoholic and the other remained a benign and cheerful man." (15) Likewise, another set of conjoined twins, the Tocci twins show a similar pattern. Like Eng, Giovanni Tocci drank beer in considerable quantities whereas Giacomo did not like beer and preferred mineral water. In addition, Giovanni an introvert (and fond of sketching), whereas Giacomo was more extraverted, and had a volatile personality (if he found some fault in Giovanni's sketch would kick the drawing off "his" knee.) (16)

Furthermore, environmental influences play a huge role in making us who we are. Every choice we make causes our life path to branch out in different ways making an impact on our identity. For instance, I would have been a different person if I had not come to the University of Kent. I would have had different experiences and met different people. My university experiences have had impact on how I see or identify myself. I do not simply mean by this that if I had not come to Kent I would have had different memories and so be a different person. Although this is true, it does not capture the full implication of my view. My university experiences have not just given me different memories, in addition they have moulded me and altered my personality. For example, my experience with philosophy has probably made me a more rational and thoughtful person. The idea, that environment shapes a person; underlies Harris's thought experiment detailing why it would be impossible to resurrect Lenin. He states,

"Lenin's embalmed body lies in its mausoleum in Moscow. Presumably a cell of this body could be denucleated and Lenin's genome cloned. Could such a process make Lenin immortal?…Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov was born on 10th April 1870 in the town of the Simbirsk on the Volga. It is this person who became and is known to us as V. I. Lenin. Even with this man's genome preserved intact we will never see Lenin again. So many things that made Vladimir Ilyich what he was cannot be reproduced, even if his genome can. We cannot recreate prerevoluntionary Russia. We cannot stimulate his environment and education; we cannot recreate his parents to bring him up and influence his development as profoundly as they undoubtedly did. We cannot make the thought of Karl Marx seem as hopeful as it must then have been; we cannot, in short, do anything but reproduce his genome and that could never be nearly enough." (17)

The naivety of genetic determinism is emphasised by the fact that genetic identity does not even constitute biological identity. Even cloned cells with identical sets of genes vary somewhat in shape and colouration. The variations are so subtle they can usually be ignored. However when cells are combined to form organisms, the differences become marked and individuality is born. "Two genetically identical individuals will unfold in slightly different ways. The shape or the kidneys or curve of the skull won't be quite the same" (18). Moreover, with the brain, the organ regarded as the seat of consciousness, the differences become profound. Johnson states, "Back of the envelope calculations show how much information a human genome contains and how much is required to specify the trillions of connections in a single brain. The conclusion is inescapable: the problem of wiring up the brain is complex that it is beyond the power of the genomic computer. The best the genes can do is indicate the rough layout of the wiring…Neurons at the early stage, are thrown together more or less at random and then left to their own devices. After birth experience makes and breaks these connections, pruning the thicket into precise circuitry." (19) From the beginning what is in the genes is different from what is in the mind, experience serves to widen the gap.

The Alleged Wisdom of Repugnance

The concept of cloning humans has become victim to what Tom Wilke, who runs the biomedical section of the Wellcome Trust in London, calls the Yuk factor (20). The Yuk factor is a shorthand term for describing the visceral fear and unease generated in the public by new biomedical advances. The variety of derogatory adjectives associated with human cloning such as, "revolting", "repugnant", "repulsive" and "grotesque" are illustrative of the fact that, the public finds the whole idea profoundly "yuk". The aim of this section is to uncover exactly how important these feelings of disgust and unease are for the morality of cloning. Indeed, many bioethical committees have suggested that these feelings are indicative of the immorality of cloning. For example, the report of the U.S.A's NBAC (National Bioethics Advisory Committee), "repeatedly cited the "strong discomfort, even revulsion" of most Americans against cloning as if revulsion was itself a moral argument against such cloning" (21). This stance is also a feature of Leon Kass's essay, "The Wisdom of Repugnance". He claims that the repugnance we feel when faced with the prospect of human cloning is " the emotional expression of a deep wisdom, beyond reason's power fully to articulate it". According to Kass, "we … feel immediately…without argument the wrongness of cloning humans". He seems to be suggesting that the emotions function as a kind of sixth sense, that immediately detects the rightness and wrongness of a practice. Both he and the NBAC seem to be subscribing to a doctrine often dubbed sentimental morality. The idea that "where people's moral sentiments are outraged by the very idea of something, this fact of itself shows that what outrages them contravenes morality" (22). The idea of sentimental morality originates with and was elaborated by the 18th century philosopher, Hume. It is unclear as to what extent the NBAC and Kass adhere to Hume's moral philosophy (they never explicitly mention him), however the basic principle appears to be the same; "Morality is more properly felt than judg'd of" (23)

The most frequently used counter-argument against the idea that our emotions of unease and disgust play a crucial role in determining whether human cloning (or indeed any other new technology or practice) is morally permissible, is the observation that our reactions to new technology and practices change. Some of yesterday's repugnances are today calmly accepted. For example, in the 1950's it was against the law in Britain to save a patient's eyesight by grafting a dead person's corneas on to a patient's eyes. (24) This was not a legal oversight, people found the idea deeply "yuk", and it took a prolonged journalistic campaign to get the law changed. The idea that feelings change, somewhat undermines Kass's view that the emotions act like extrasensory preceptors that detect right and wrong. However, I am not convinced that the mere fact that we get used to a new technology, and begin to accommodate and accept it, serves as a valid argument for it. To quote Raskolinikov, the protagonist of Fyoder Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment, "Man gets used to everything - the beast". All that is happening is that our distaste is turning to approval. We are still in the realm of feelings. How do we know whether these feelings are any more right than our former feelings?

The problem with the "feeling" approach to ethics is that it assumes that a sense of outrage and unease is always a sense of moral outrage and unease. However, this does not necessarily seem the case. Many of our feelings can be classified differently. For example, we are familiar with talking about, feelings of squeamishness and aesthetic feelings, as well as feelings of prejudice. If the Yuk factor can be equated with or not be properly distinguished from these other feelings then we should not give it any moral weight. Those who subscribe to sentimental morality owe us an account of how to distinguish our moral feelings from these other sorts of feelings. We need to know exactly what it is about moral feelings that entitle them to the prefix "moral". If we knew this we could describe a prejudiced feeling of disgust against using dead people's corneas to restore sight to patient's eyes, as changing to an enlightened moral feeling for it. Moreover, we need to ascertain whether moral feelings alone, do indeed determine the morality of a new technology, practice or action.

I personally believe that we can distinguish moral feelings from other feelings, however I do not think this is an avenue that Kass and the NBAC would want to follow. I would contend that for something to count as a moral feeling a special type of thought about the object, action or practice must accompany it. This differs from the views of Kass and the NBAC. They seem to presume that our feelings of moral approval and disapproval do not need to be related to particular thoughts or beliefs about the object, practice or action, in order to make them moral. Indeed, the idea that a moral feeling of disgust and repugnance comes to our attention independently of any thought about the practice of cloning humans, is suggested by Steve Holtzman's statement to the NBAC. He asserts that, "there is a very human tendency to know what one wants to do but not be clear about necessarily why". This stance is echoed in Kass's contention that our emotions possess a wisdom that is incapable of being articulated by reason. We feel a special type of feeling and this tells us that cloning is wrong. Unfortunately, for Holzman and Kass this line of argument might be employed by a racist or a sexist. Moreover, it forces us to count wacky beliefs, such as the belief that that a man who clasps his hands three times an hour deserves moral approval, as an acceptable moral belief. (25) If a person feels approval at these things, sentimental morality can do little more than nod its head. If I protest to Kass that I do not feel repugnance at the thought of human clones, he would probably accuse me of having warped moral feelings (after all he does seem to regard his position as objectively right). However, because he is dedicated to sentimental morality, Kass cannot give a reason as to why my feelings are warped, without abandoning his theory. Without anything to appeal to other than feelings, sentimental morality reaches an early stalemate on moral issues.

However, we need not take this view about feelings of moral approval and disapproval. Following Phillipa Foot, (26) we can assert that we cannot logically feel moral approval or disapproval at just anything. We need to have certain beliefs and thoughts about the object, practice or action that we are evaluating in order to evaluate it as either morally good, or bad, respectively. In order to be worthy of the prefix moral, our moral feelings should be connected to particular features about the object, practice or action. If feelings do not show this relation then they are incorrectly called moral feelings. Foot attempts to gain support for the idea that there are logical limits to what a person can morally approve or disapprove by discussing some other mental attitudes, which she sees as being related in a certain way to their objects. For example, Foot suggests that there are logical limits to the things a man can be proud of, about which he can indeed feel pride. Pride is not simply an internal sensation, "so that one might naturally beat one's breast and say 'pride is something I feel here'". Foot asserts that, "Given any description of an object, action, personal characteristic etc., it is not possible to rule it out as an object of pride". She claims that before we do so we need to what would be said of it by a man who is proud of it, or feels proud of it. The characteristic object of pride is something that is seen as in some way a man's own and as some sort of achievement. Unless the object fulfils this criteria a feeling pride cannot be ascribed. Thus, Foot comments that the idea that someone can feel proud of something like the sky or the sea is nonsensical, or at least nonsensical in normal circumstances. We can only make sense of such a feeling as pride if we make a special assumption about the person's beliefs, for example that "he is under some crazy delusion that he has saved the sky from falling, or the sea from drying up." Foot goes on to suggest that a person can only feel moral disapproval towards an object, action or practice if they believe that the object will cause harm in some way. Similarly, they can only feel moral approval if they feel that it will benefit people in some way. Thus, it would be impossible to count the clasping of hands as a moral virtue because there is absolutely no point to it. There is no way in which it (without a special background) could cause benefit or harm to anyone. The plausibility of Foot's stance is vindicated by our response to a thought experiment. Imagine you are watching a catwalk show, two models walk up the catwalk, one wearing a fur coat and the other wearing a green poker-dotted suit. You feel disgusted by both these outfits. However, you would probably not feel inclined to count the disgust felt at the poker-dotted suit as a moral feeling. I would contend that this is because it is connected merely to the look of the outfit, the outfit is not harmful in any way. You would be inclined however, to count the feeling of disgust at the fur coat as a moral feeling. This is because your disgust can feasibly be connected to harm. It is a response to the suffering caused to the animals slaughtered to make this coat and others like it.

An objection might be made at this point, that I unfairly dismissed Kass and the NBAC's sentimental morality from being able to distinguish between moral feelings and other feelings. Do not Kass and the NBAC believe that human cloning is harmful? They do, however the problem with their view (and the reason they are unable to distinguish between moral feelings and other feelings) is why they think human cloning is harmful. The trouble with the views of Kass and the NBAC are that they suggest that our special feelings of moral repugnance alone prove conclusively that cloning is immoral and harmful. Foot however does not make such a strong suggestion. She says that our moral feelings are connected with the thought that this object causes harm. We cannot feel moral repugnance unless we hold the belief that cloning causes harm. This differs from Kass and the NBAC who suggest that our feeling of moral repugnance shows that cloning causes harm. Thus, Foot's viewpoint allows for the possibility that our thoughts (and so our feelings) are wrong. For example, we could be under a delusional belief, or simply mistaken, about what the practice, object or action actually amounts to. The second possibility seems to be a common phenomenon with regard to cloning. A lot of our feelings are based on misconceptions about cloning. For instance, people are often disturbed by cloning because they feel that if someone cloned them the resulting clone would be identical in looks, personality and beliefs. They regard cloning as a threat to their sense of individuality. However, as we have seen this is to confuse genetic identity with personal identity. The fact we have strong emotions about cloning functions as a flag, warning us to watch carefully here; however, our feelings do not determine the morality of this practice. In order to determine the morality of cloning, we must make sure that our thoughts and beliefs about this practice stem from the facts, not science fiction.

The unnaturalness of cloning

It has been claimed that our fear of human cloning is related to the fact that cloning is unnatural. This fact is often thought to give justification to our feelings of "yuk". However, I believe that in its most straightforward sense, this argument is a non-starter. Cloning does deviate from our natural means of reproduction, but this fact alone is not sufficient to render it immoral. If unnaturalness were indicative of the ethical unacceptability of a practice, then the whole of modern medicine would be rendered immoral. Any medical intervention is an attempt to prevent or modify a natural process. If we took this idea seriously we would have a duty to let a young girl who had stopped breathing die, rather than attempt to revive her with mouth-mouth resuscitation. A view that leads to such conclusions is untenable.

Human Dignity

In this section, I shall examine the claim that cloning is offensive to human dignity. Appeals to human dignity and our moral obligation to protect it has been an almost universal feature of the official responses to cloning, as well as a stable argument in more popular commentaries provided by the media. The statement from Dr. Hiroshii, director of the World Health Organisation (WHO) is a perfect example. Dr. Hiroshii states, "WHO considers the use of cloning for the replication of human individuals to be an ethically unacceptable act as it would violate some of the basic principles that govern medically assisted procreation. These include respect for the dignity of the human being". (27)UNESCO takes a similar line. UNESCO's "Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights" states that "Practices which are contrary to human dignity such as the reproductive cloning of human beings shall not be permitted." (28) This section will explore the questions arising from the assertion that cloning is contrary to human dignity. The most obvious question being, are they right? Does the idea that cloning sits in opposition to human dignity have any validity? More specifically, this section will explore whether cloning is intrinsically contrary to human dignity; or whether it is particular features of particular applications of cloning, that are contrary to human dignity. This is a significant point, if the latter is the case, Dr. Hiroshii and others like him will have no justification for condemning cloning per se. They will have to allow that cloning in itself is not wrong, only specific applications of it.

Before I explore the question of whether cloning is contrary to human dignity, we need to be clear about what this concept actually is. Unfortunately, dignity, despite being an intuitively attractive concept is incredibly nebulous and notoriously difficult to define. Although we think we know what the concept means, it seems to elude strict definition. Thus, it is perhaps easier to get a feel of the concept by appealing to examples. For instance, we might say that people in war-ridden countries such as Kosovo and Sierra Leone find it difficult to retain a sense of dignity. A recent report from Sierra Leone talked about how the inhabitants of Freetown were attempting to get on with their daily lives and keep a sense of dignity after many of their friends and relatives were massacred in a vicious rebel attack. Moreover, we might regard dying of a degenerative disease such as Huntington's disease and Alzheimer's disease as undignified. Indeed, advocates of euthanasia, often claim that euthanasia offers patients with terminal illnesses the chance to die with dignity. Dignity seems to be connected with the idea that humans have certain fundamental needs, desires and attributes. Thus, to treat a person as a person, is to recognise and respect these needs, desires and attributes. A useful analogy here might be a hen in a battery cage. Animal rights activists often claim that keeping hens in battery cages is unethical because the cages do not allow the hens to satisfy fundamental needs or desires, such as the need or desire to stretch their wings. Similarly, the rebel attack on the citizens of Freetown was a disregard for human dignity because the rebels were refusing to recognise the needs, desires and attributes of the occupants of Freetown. The rebel attack refused to respect that the citizens of Freetown were autonomous individuals, and that they had their own plans and projects for life. Instead, the rebel soldiers saw them as a way to achieve their own project, the usurpation of the current Sierra Leone government. The picture of a father reading to his child, shown when the reporter talked about the individuals attempting to retain dignity, poignantly illustrates this point. The father and child were pursuing their own project and leading their own lives.

When we turn to questions of what human dignity is, we cannot avoid turning to Kant's doctrine of "Respect for Persons" (29). Indeed, my above example, seems to have Kantian elements to it. Kant believed that we should use a person never simply as a means but also treat them as an end. To fully understand what Kant means by this we must further elaborate the term "means" and the term "ends". The word "end" seems to have been used by Kant to mean "that which is valuable in itself" In contrast, to regard something as valuable as a means, is to regard it as valuable merely for what one can get out of it – it is no more than useful. Applying this to persons, we can say that the meaning of the injunction, to treat and regard people not merely as means but also as ends, is that we ought to treat them as valuable in themselves and not only as useful instruments to our own goals. This still leaves some confusion; for example, what do we mean by "valuable in itself"? I would contend that to regard something as valuable in itself, we must cherish it for what it is, we must care about its essential features-those which make it what it is. Thus, respecting persons seems to be synonymous with respecting a generic human self, or respecting the features that make us human and give us our human natures. Kant felt that the distinctive feature of a human was his rational will. This faculty gives a human being his distinctive ability to choose for himself, and to formulate purposes, plans and policies of his own. People alone can act from reasons, as opposed to be acted on from external causes. Kant claimed that it was inconsistent with treating an individual as a free and rational being, to ever use him as a mere means to the satisfaction to our own goals. To do so denies him his autonomy.

In the context of cloning, the Kantian notion of using someone as a means rather than treating them as an end, is often invoked by commentators to provide basis for the objection that human cloning is contrary to human dignity. Moreover, rights such as the right to a unique genetic identity and the right to two parents, are also appealed to. The commentators seem to suppose that we need these rights to protect features that make us human; thus, these rights can be seen as being closely connected to human dignity.

Instrumentalisation

The idea of using an individual as means, rather than treating them as end, is sometimes termed instrumentalisation. The consultation document of the Human Genetics Advisory Commission, "Cloning Issues in Reproduction, Science and Medicine", identifies three cases in which cloning by nuclear transfer might involve the instrumental use of the child created in that way:
  • A parent wishing to "replace" a dead child.
  • Producing by cloning, a sibling of a dying child, in order to supply compatible organs or tissues.
  • Seeking to use cloning in an attempt to cheat death
Moreover, Axel Kahn claims that non-reproductive cloning, or tissue regeneration, violates the Kantian notion of treating humans as ends.

"The creation of human clones solely for spare cell lines would, from a philosophical point of view, be in obvious contradiction to the principle expressed by Emmanuel Kant: that of human dignity. This principle demands that an individual – and I would extend this to read human life – should never be thought of as a means, but also as an end. Created human life for the sole purpose of preparing therapeutic material would clearly not be for the dignity of the life created" (30)

Furthermore, it has been claimed that embryo twinning is instrumental. In the future, it could be possible to allow genetic and other screening by embryo biopsy. Embryo splitting could be used to provide a twin embryo for biopsy, permitting an embryo, undamaged by invasive procedures, to be available for implantation, following the result of the biopsy on its twin. Some commentators feel that in this case one twin has been sacrificed for the sake of the other.

The first objections I shall examine, are Kahn's objections to using embryos to create therapeutic material, as well as the objections to using embryo splitting to provide a twin for biopsy. These cases are different in kind, from those involving reproductive cloning by nuclear transplantation because, it is highly controversial as to whether human embryos fall within the scope of Kant's, or any other moral principle. If they do not, Kant's principle is ill applied and objections involving this principle invalid.

The key question here is: do embryos have a right to life? If they do it would seem unjustified to sacrifice the life of one embryo for another embryo or fully-grown human being. However, as Tooley (31) has noted, the only beings that have a right to life are those who can conceive of themselves as distinct entities existing over time. His argument is based on the claim that there is a conceptual connection between the desires a being is capable of having, and the rights which it is said to have. Embryos that would be used in tissue regeneration and biopsy are bundles of two to eight cells. They are not conscious, yet alone self-conscious, and so cannot be said to have any desires.

Other philosophers have replied that although an embryo is not capable of desiring, it has the potential to develop into a creature that can; and therefore we should allow embryos the right to life. However, as Harris has noted we are all potentially dead, but this does not appear to constitute a reason for treating us as dead now. (32) Moreover, some embryo cells become a part of the placenta not a part of a self-conscious person.

I will now turn to the cases involving cloning by nuclear transfer. To reiterate these cases were:
  • A parent using cloning in order to replace a dead child
  • A person seeking to use cloning in an attempt to cheat death
  • Producing by cloning, a sibling of a dying child, in order to have a compatible organ or tissue donor.
However, before we consider whether the children in these cases are being treated as a means rather than ends, we need to separate cloning fact from cloning fiction. In their extreme versions, cases A and B embody the confusions about identity mentioned in "Misconceptions: Cloning, Identity and Immortality"; namely the idea, to reformulate an old phrase, that the genes maketh the man. However, it has been established that genetic identity does not constitute personal or even biological identity. It is impossible to re-create any human being, even physiologically. Thus, the new child produced by cloning would not be a carbon copy of the first child, and cloning would not be an effective way of achieving immortality. Separated from these confusions, all these cases raise questions about the instrumental use of another human being, but the questions are not tied to the cloning aspect. One could decide to have a child in the normal way for any of these motives; to replace a dead child, to create a compatible organ or tissue donor, and to ensure that something of oneself survives one's own death, for example, when a child is engendered to provide a heir.

However, the Kantian principle is indeterminate. Although there are extreme cases that we see as definitely instrumental, for example slavery; and those at the other end of the spectrum that we can see as definitely not instrumental, for instance, a close friendship; there are a great many cases falling in between these two extremes where it is confusing as to whether the Kantian principle applies or not. John Harris thinks that if we seriously applied the Kantian principle, we would have to outlaw blood transfusions. "The beneficiary neither knowing of, nor usually caring about the anonymous donor uses the blood (and its donor) as a means to her own ends". (33) Similarly, R.E. Lewonlin (34) says that we could be regarded as treating the plumber we call in to fix the kitchen sink instrumentally. It has been argued however, that these two examples miss a crucial restriction that Kant places on instrumentalisation. They overlook the emphasis Kant placed on the word "exclusively". Kant does not states that one must not treat a person as a means, he adds the qualification that one must never treat a person exclusively as a means. Thus, it might be argued that we can exclude the above examples as cases of instrumentalisation because in these cases the person is not being treated exclusively as a means. For example, in the case of the plumber it can be claimed that although I only require the plumber to fix my kitchen sink, I recognise that this is not his sole purpose, I realise and I think it would be fair to say that most people realise, that he has a life outside his occupation. Likewise, if the beneficiary of the blood donation took time to reflect, she would not envisage her donor as a blood letting machine, rather as a person who just happened to give blood. Unlike the slave owner who thinks that his slave exists solely to fulfil his needs, the beneficiary recognises that the donor has other aspects to his life. The importance of emphasizing "exclusively" has been used insightfully in the context of cloning. In a response to the Consultation Document of the Human Genetic Advisory Commission, the Centre of Applied Ethics at the University of Kent seems to use this distinction to form its position on instrumental uses of cloning. Focusing on cases A (replacing a child) and B (wanting something of oneself to survive after ones death), the Centre states that "it might be maintained that having a child simply for that reason would amount to an instrumental use of that child." However, the Centre goes on to say that if other motives can also be attributed to the parents, then it is possible to square cases A and B with Kantian dictates.

"...having a child because one wanted to bring into life another human being who would have a full and satisfying life would be a paradigmatically non-instrumental reason for having a child. And if that reason for having a child is strengthened by the desire to replace a dead child, or the thought that something of ones biological identity might continue to live after one's death, that does not turn the reason in to a paradigmatically non-instrumental one"

Some commentators have much stronger views that this. They claim that instrumental parental intentions do not matter at all. What is significant, is how you treat the child once it is born. R.E. Lewonwin (35)states that he " was conceived out of my father's desires for a male heir". However, he claims that "In retrospect, I am glad they were my parents". He believes that to condemn human cloning because it might sometimes be used for instrumental purposes is to miss both the complexity of human motivation and the unpredictability of developing personal relationships. He points out that there is "Not a simple relation between those initial motivations and the resulting family relations". I think Lewonwin makes a valid point. I believe that how the child is treated once he or she is born is of greater moral significance than the reasons a parent has for wanting a child. One can decide to have a baby for the best reasons in the world, and yet when faced with the reality, can become a truly appalling parent. However, I feel that Lewonwin's view overlooks the practical reality of cloning. With reproductive technologies there is a third party involved, the clinic, whom have a responsibility to ensure as much as they possibly can (in many ways to protect themselves) that the child they help create is well-treated. Therefore, it will be "safer" for them to err on the side of caution and exclude parents with purely instrumental motives. Although initial parental motivations are not a conclusive indication of how the child will be looked after, they are the best indication that the clinic will have.

I think that "replacing" a child by cloning is more ethically problematic than "replacing" a child through normal reproduction. I am not entirely happy about the term replacing as it masks the complexity of the situation. What we are actually talking about is a situation where a person had no intentions of having any other children, but because of the death of their child, decided to have another child. My problem with cloning is that I do not understand why the parent should decide to have a child by cloning, rather than conceive a child in the normal way. Why insist on cloning? I feel that the parent may be taking the idea of "replacing" too literally, that they are subscribing to genetic determinism and are under the illusion that they can get their child back. A subscription to genetic determinism is a conceptual blunder; however, I believe that holding this belief can lead a person to make moral blunders. It could prevent the parents from treating and valuing their child as a unique individual. The parents might constantly compare the second child with the first and scold or chide him for not acting the way he should or liking the things he should like (given that he was engendered to be a carbon copy of his brother). Thus, the child would feel he was living his life in someone else's shadow. I feel that this would be an oppressive and psychologically disabling burden to bear. Perhaps there are exception cases. Lee Silver (36)uses an example of a woman whose two young children have died in a car accident. This woman is now infertile. Although she conceived her first children in the normal way, several months after their births she under went chemotherapy for the treatment of cancer. The treatment, although a success, left her sterile. Silver suggests that a physician in the hospital retrieved tissue samples from the children shortly after their death and froze them to preserve them. He then goes on to suggest that two years later, when the parents have got over their loss, the physician informs the couple of his actions and tells them how it might be possible for them to have their own genetic children by cloning. In this very unusual circumstance, cloning to "replace" a child does not seem ethically unacceptable. We feel that because of the time lapse, the parents will not see their new children as new individuals. I am however, slightly concerned with how contrived Silver's example is. I do not think that there would be too many physicians that would have removed tissue from a dead child without telling (or getting permission from) the parents. This is significant because the time lapsing between the children's death, and their knowledge of the preserved tissue, means that they have had time to come to terms with their children's death. One fear is that if this were an option for parents in the midst of grief, they would be more likely to see the new child, not as a new individual, but as their old child born again.

The case of the creating a child to provide an organ donor, or tissue donor, for a dying child is more difficult to classify than the first two cases. The reason for this is that there are some instances of organ donation that we would see as unequivocally instrumental, whereas other cases are more controversial. It clearly makes a significant difference whether we are cloning a child in order to use an irreplaceable organ, such as a heart, or cloning a child in order to use a replaceable resource such as a person's bone marrow. It hardly needs to be said that giving birth to a child and then ripping its heart out is an instrumental and extremely wicked use of a child. The child will die; one child is literally being sacrificed to save another. However, extracting a child's bone marrow is relatively risk free. The child will be able to replenish his resources of bone marrow and go on to live a normal healthy life. Despite this, many commentators still have reservations. They imply that although this procedure will not physically damage the child it will psychologically impair. Fitzgerald comments, "What sense of equality or dignity does a child begin to possess when the realization dawns that he or she was produced ... principally to provide a biological part for another" (37). I think we can apply the idea that instrumental motives cease to be instrumental motives if they are squared with non-instrumental motives in order to answer Fitzgerald. To give birth to a child, extract its bone marrow and then abandon it, is to treat it instrumentally or "principally to provide a biological part for another". A child who later in his life decides to find his real or biological family would definitely feel used and treated unjustly if he discovered that they had given him away because he had served his purpose. However, if a parent has the desire to have a child in order to provide their other child with new bone marrow, combined with the desire to provide the new child with a full and satisfying life, this action is not purely instrumental. In such cases, we feel that the child will be appreciated as much as the first child. The child may ask questions in later life about why they were produced, however I think that the parent would be able to reassure them that they were wanted for and are now appreciated for who they are. The way they have been treated and loved is surely evidence for this. Marissa Ayala, a child engendered by normal reproduction to provide her dying sister with compatible bone marrow does not seem to feel devalued by this fact. Indeed, in a CNN interview she is said to have "positively beamed when she told the interviewer, 'I saved her (her sister Anissa's) life'" (38).

However, given the possibility of tissue regeneration, I do not think that this application will be often used. Deciding to have a child, a tremendous commitment anyway; to provide tissue for a dying child, is a heavyweight decision and only considered as a last resort. Tissue regeneration provides an alternative, and an ethically less problematic option.

The most important point, however, is that there is nothing intrinsically instrumental about producing a child by cloning. Although, authorities such as WHO and UNESCO could maintain that particular applications of cloning are instrumental they cannot sensibility assert that cloning per se is instrumental, which is what they seem to be doing in their statements. Two more possible uses of cloning that have been suggested are the case of lesbian couples who want to have children, and cases in which one or both partners are infertile. There seems nothing necessarily or inherently instrumental about these proposals.

The Right to a Unique Genetic Identity

In their discussions of cloning, the European Parliament (39) appealed to the idea that, "each individual has a right to his or her own genetic identity". According to the European Parliament, having a genome identical to someone else is objectionable, and more significantly transgresses a fundamental human right. Despite the European Parliament's stamp of approval, the notion of a right to a unique genetic identity seems somewhat confused. Firstly, it is unclear who could possess such a right. The person who is born as the result of cloning is certainly not a contender, because he would not have existed if he had not been cloned. Such a right, "reverses the proper logical relationship between rights and identity; one's identity as an individual is what gives rise to rights, rather than itself being the content of a right" (40). Moreover, it is difficult to sensibly maintain that one can have a right to an individual genetic identity given the presence of a large number of naturally conceived genetically identical individuals. The natural occurrence of monozygotic twins is one in 270 pregnancies. Thus, in the United Kingdom, with a population of about 58 million, over 200 thousand such pregnancies have occurred. As Harris sardonically notes, "How are we to regard human rights violations on such a grand scale?" (41) Moreover, it is incorrect to suggest that clones produced by nuclear transfer share the exact genotype of their parents (although, clones produced by embryo twinning do share the same genotype as each other). The Mitochondrial DNA of the clone is different from that of its parent. Therefore, one could say that such a right is not an objection to cloning by nuclear transfer, only embryo twinning.

However, although perhaps not best formulated in terms of the right to a genetic identity, the issues and motivational factors behind this right are comprehensible. Appeals to such a right reflects the general public's fear and confusions about cloning. For example, the idea that the clone will have an identical personality and beliefs to the person it was cloned from. However, as we determined in "Misconceptions: Cloning Identity and Immortality", this fear is ungrounded. Genetic identity is not personal identity. My individuality is the result of having a unique consciousness with a unique personal history, shaped not only by genetic inheritance but also by environmental, social and biological factors. The experience of identical twins indicates that a unique genetic identity is not essential for a human being to feel, and be, individual.

Lederberg (42) however still feels that there is a problem with people sharing the same genetic make up. He points out that with clones, someone has made the choice that such and such a person should be genetically identical to another. The result of this is that clones suffer a "genetic bondage", which diminishes autonomy as it reduces the option of choices that create individuality. However, it is unclear why someone who has been cloned will have less autonomy than someone produced by normal sexual reproduction. If genes restrict our choices, then everyone is faced with the same restriction determined by the genes they have. Whether someone has picked our genotype, or not, is simply irrelevant.

However, even when the myth of genetic determinism is dispelled, some doubts about cloning and identity remain. These doubts concern the creation of multiples. We seem to be able to cope with the thought of being one of a pair of clones. This is not any more disturbing than being one of a pair of identical twins. However, the thought of being one of a large number (perhaps a hundred) of cloned individuals makes us intensely uneasy. What we seem to be reacting to is the fact that we would all look alike. We realise that "a person's individual identity is not constituted by his/her genetic identity" however it appears that "one's sense of individuality is at least in part determined by one's distinctive physical appearance." (43) The importance of a person's distinct physical appearance is demonstrated by the fact that this is used, by others, to immediately identity them. Indeed there are people that we identity only by physical appearance, for example the girl who serves at the shop or waits at the bus stop. If there were a hundred people that looked the same it would be harder for the outside world to tell them apart and consequentially treat them as separate individuals. To others, you would become a token of a type, a Gary or a Jon. One can imagine a certain physical appearance having a certain stereotype associated with it. If others treated you as type it would be difficult for you to feel like an individual. This can be illustrated by our reaction to being described as a typical member of a group (for example, a typical student). We find this offensive, we do not like to be thought of as being the same as everyone else. If we are to be defined in reference to a group, we prefer being thought of as the exceptional member, for example, a brilliant musician. If being a part of a multiple threatens our sense of individuality (a feeling that seems to be of utmost importance to us), then this seems a good reason for condemning this application of cloning and not allowing the technique to be used in this way. However, to be honest this does not seem application of the human cloning technique that has been seriously envisaged. Apart from the unlikeliness of some actually wanting to create a hundred clones, it also seems impractical. How is this person going to convince a hundred women to bring these children to term and who is going look after them after their birth?

The Right to Two Parents

The right to two parents is perhaps the most bizarre right to have emerged from discussions about the ethics of cloning. Bentham's felt rights were "nonsense on stilts"; this right certainly seems worthy of his label. The idea of having two parents is, in itself, unclear. What are the commentators objecting to, not having two parents to look after the clone once it is born or, not having two genetic parents? If it is the former, then it is of course only violated if the clone if brought up in a one-parent family. This does not necessarily seem to be the case; there are many infertile couples who would like the opportunity to have a child through cloning. Moreover, if there is such a right, it is widely violated. Furthermore, there is no evidence of any harm produced by its violation. Single mothers are likely to find such a proposal highly insulting. If it is the latter, then it is not violated through cloning. It is false to regard the nucleus donor as the genetic parent of the child. The clone is the twin brother or sister (delayed twin if you like) of the nucleus donor, and the genetic offspring of the nucleus donor's own parents. It is simply impossible to have less than two genetic parents.

There is one way in which cloning could violate the right to two genetic parents. The de-nucleated egg into which the nucleus is placed, contains mitochondrial DNA. The presence of the mitochondrial DNA means that the genetic inheritance of clones is richer, or more variously derived, than that of other individuals. If what is important is that an individual contains genetic material from more than one person, then the commentators seem to be committed to saying, "Two parents good, three parents better".

Although I have characterised this right as nonsensical, the motivation behind it is intelligible. However, the motivation loses much of its intelligibility when formulated in the language of rights. Behind the appeals to the right to two parents is a concern that cloning will effect the genetic diversity of mankind. Sexual reproduction seems to have evolved for the purpose of staying ahead of ever-mutating pathogens. Novel combinations of genes, created through reproduction, help immune systems devise defenses against rapidly evolving germs, viruses and parasites. The fear is that if human beings were cloned, pathogens would get the upper hand, causing widespread disease. The analogy, often cited is the effect of a lot of farmers, in one area, adopting the same corn hybrid. If the hybrid is susceptible to a particular bug, the crop fails.

However, such an effect is only plausible if there are millions of clones of one person – which is extremely unlikely. With cloning there might be a slight increase in the number of identical twins and triplets, thus the risk of raging epidemics is no more likely than it is a present. This fear is misplaced.

Conclusion

In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke suggests that one function of philosophy is to clear "the ground a little" and remove "some of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge" (44). Human cloning is a topic in which much "rubbish" lies in the way of knowledge and sound thinking. I believe that once we have cleared "the ground a little" and dispelled the myths of genetic determinism, cloning is less of an ethical threat than initially thought. As we have seen, cloning is not intrinsically instrumental, and not always a threat to individuality. Specific applications of cloning could be regarded as instrumental; for example creating a clone for a nonrenewable resource, such as a heart; or a threat to our individuality, for instance, the creation of multiples. However, this does not justify pronouncing cloning per se immoral, only specific applications of it. Cloning can be used for good ends; for example, tissue regeneration to save the lives of those dying of leukemia and to relieve the suffering of those with Parkinson's disease. Moreover, cloning will enable infertile couples to have the baby they so desperately want. IVF only works for 25% of patients (45). This leaves millions of people unable to have children, often because they cannot produce viable eggs and sperm, even with fertility drugs. A blanket condemnation of cloning is unjustified.

Notes

Introduction

1. In Lee Silver, Remaking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998, chapter 8

2. A mouse with a human ear springs to mind.

3. From Gregory Pence's Who's Afraid of Human Cloning?, Rowman and Littlefield, (1998), chapter 1

4. Examples from Pence's Who's Afraid of Human Cloning? and Gina Kolata's Clone: The Road to Dolly and the Path Ahead, Penguin, 1997

5. From Pence Who's Afraid of Human Cloning

6. John Harris, "Goodbye Dolly: the ethics of human cloning", in The Journal of Medical ethics (1997)

7. However I have briefly sketched out these issues in the appendix as I feel that it is important to be aware of what they are

What is Cloning?

8. From Silver's Remaking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World, chapter 8

9. The fact the lamb originated from an udder cell prompted Wilmut to give her the name Dolly after Dolly Parton who he joked was also known for her mammaries.

10. Cited in Harris, "Goodbye Dolly: the ethics of human cloning"

11. This is mentioned by Kolata in Clone: The Road to Dolly and the Path Ahead

Misconceptions: Cloning, Identity and Immorality

12. This case is mentioned by Robin Harwood in "Hello Dolly, goodbye death?", www.philosophers.co.uk/noframes/articles/dollynf

13. This is mentioned by Wilmut in an interview by Arlene Judith Klotzko, "Voices from Roslin: The Creators of Dolly Discuss Science, Ethics and Social Responsibility", in Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics, 1998

14. Harry Harris, "Cloning can bring back my dead son", SundayTimes, 9 March 1997.

15. From Gould's "Dolly's Fashion and Louis's Passion", Natural History, June 1997.

16. These cases are mentioned by Pence in Who's Afraid of Human Cloning, chapter 2

17. John Harris, "Human Cloning and Human Dignity", in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 1998

18. George Johnson, "Don't Worry They Still Can't Clone a Human Brain", New York Times, 2 March 1997

19. Ibid. In 1997 scientists discovered that how much a baby is talked to and with how much affection dramatically effects how many neural pathways are formed in its brain. This is related to Johnson's point that the genes do not determine the brain and given the general acceptance of mind-brain supervenience the mind. See Sandra Blakesee's "Babies Brains are Dynamos of Intellect" New York Times, 17 April 1997.

The Alleged Wisdom of Repugnance

20. Wilke is mentioned by Oliver Morton in "Overcoming Yuk", www.wired.com/wired/6.01/morton

21. Pence, Who's Afraid of Human Cloning, chapter 1

22. This definition of sentimental morality is given by John Harris in Cloning, Ethics and Immortality, Oxford University Press, 1998, chapter 2

23. This comment is from Hume's A Treatise on Human Nature. An extract of this is found in Singer's Ethics, Oxford University Press, 1994, which is where I found the quote.

24. Norton, "Overcoming Yuk"

25. This example originates from Phillipa Foot's "Moral Beliefs"

26. See Phillipa Foot's essays "Moral Beliefs" in her book Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, Basil Blackwell, 1978

Human Dignity

27. Cited in Harris, "Goodbye Dolly: the ethics of human cloning"

28. Cited in Ronald Bailey's "Send in the Clones", www.reason.com/9806/bk.bailey

29. This doctrine was proposed by in his Grounding for a Metaphysics of Morals

30. Axel Kahn, "Clone Mammals…Clone Man?", Nature, 386

31. Cited in Singer's Practical Ethics, Cambridge University Press, 1979, chapter 4

32. Mentioned in Harris, Clones, Genes and Immortality, chapter 2

33. Harris, "Human Cloning and Human Dignity"

34. R.C. Lewontin, "The Confusion over Cloning", www.nybooks.com.nyrev/WWWarchdisplay.cgi?1997102318R

35. Ibid.

36. Silver, Remaking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World, chapter 8

37. Kevin T. Fitzgerald, "Human Cloning: Analysis and Evaluation", Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics,1998

38. Cited in Silver, Remarking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World, chapter 8

39. John Harris mentions that the European Parliament believes we have a right to a unique genetic identity and a right to two parents in his essay, "Goodbye Dolly: the ethics of human cloning".

40. Comment by Centre of Applied Ethics at the University of Kent

41. Harris, "Goodbye Dolly: the ethics of human cloning"

42. Cited in Ruth F. Chadwick, "Cloning", Philosophy,1982

43. Comment from the Centre of Applied Ethics at the University of Kent

Conclusion

44. John Locke, "Epistle to the Reader", in his Treatise on the Human Understanding

45. Cited in Mark D. Eibert, "Human Cloning, Infertility, and Reproductive Freedom", www.reason.com/opeds/eibert
 
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